1. N.E. 1155^a1-15.

2. “...[friendship] is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods;...” N.E. (Ross) 1155^a1-5.

3. N.E. 1156^a3-^b30.

4. N.E.(W) 1155^a2. Ross translates the same section, to the same effect: “... [friendship] is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods;...” N.E.(R) 1155^a1-5.

5. N.E.(I) 1170^a14.

6. The initial argument, in its entirety, appears in Ross: “... life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or thinking. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good; and that which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems pleasant to all man); but we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life or to a life spent in pain; for such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. ... But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men life is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy); and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that is we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant (for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self) — if all this be true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend.” N.E. 1170^a14-^b8.

7. N.E.(R) 1170^b8-14.

8. N.E.(R) 1170^b15-19.

9. See John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship” (from Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. University of California Press/1980). p.318 f18.

10. N.E.(R) 1171^b32-1172^a1. Irwin translates the same section as: “...friendship is community, and we are related to our friend as we are related to ourselves. Hence, since the perception of our own being is choiceworthy, so is the perception of our friend’s being. Perception is active when we live with him; hence, not surprisingly, this is what we seek.”

11. Cooper, p.320.

12. E.E. 1240^a14-23.

13. N.E.(I) 1166^a1-10.

14. See especially M.M. 1211^a25-40.

15. “Eudemus” states, “It will be clear if we ascertain what is life in its active sense and its end. Clearly, it is perception and knowledge, and therefore life in society is perception and knowledge in common. And mere perception and mere knowledge is most desirable to every one, and hence the desire of living is congenital in all; for living must be regarded as a kind of knowledge. If then we were cut off and abstract mere knowledge and its opposite — this passes unnoticed in the argument as we have given it, but in fact need not remain unnoticed — there would be no difference between this and another’s knowing instead of oneself; and this is like another’s living instead of oneself. But naturally the perception and knowledge of oneself is more desirable. For we must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also the good, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as belongs to them.” E.E. 1244^b24-1245^a1.

16. E.E. 1245^a3-11.

17. M.M. 1213^a7-26.

18. Ross notes, “i.e. the attribute of goodness and that of being their own.”

19. N.E.(R) 1169^b29-1170^a4.

20. N.E.(R) 1170^a5-11.

Aristotle. Eudemian Ethics (translated by J. Solomon, 1915), from The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1925), Volume IX.

Aristotle. Magna Moralia (translated by St. George Stock, 1915), from The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1925), Volume IX.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (translated by Terence Irwin). (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1985). [indicated in notes as N.E.(I)]

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (translated by David Ross). Oxford (New York: University Press 1925). [indicated in notes as N.E.(R)]

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (translated by J. E. C. Welldon). (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books 1987). [indicated in notes as N.E.(W)]

Aristotle. The Politics (translated by Carnes Lord). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984).

John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship.” Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1980). pp.301-340.